Semi-Obscured: A Natural Field Study of Carrier Legitimacy and Safety Patterns

Objective

This natural field experiment aimed to observe semi-truck traffic near an Amazon warehouse and identify carrier characteristics patterns, focusing on safety compliance and potential operational affiliations.'

Methodology

The observation occurred over 37 minutes at a location within one mile of an Amazon distribution center. During this time, the experimenter photographed and recorded each semi-truck that passed the observation point, documenting 13 unique carriers.

Notably, several trucks were observed operating bobtail (without a trailer), making it difficult to determine whether they were actively hauling for Amazon or participating in the Amazon Relay program. The lack of trailers limited the ability to confirm direct affiliations.

Following the observation, public safety records were reviewed for each carrier using federal databases, focusing on Out-of-Service (OOS) rates for drivers and vehicles—key indicators of a carrier’s compliance and safety performance.

Results

Of the 13 carriers observed, none had a principal contact name that appeared to be of U.S. origin. While this alone does not confirm the nationality of ownership or operators, it may suggest a high concentration of immigrant-owned or foreign-operated trucking companies near this distribution hub.

The table below outlines each carrier’s reported OOS rates based on available inspection data:

Table One: Average Out-of-Service Data for Each Carrier

Adjusted Analysis

Carriers 10–13 had little or no inspection history, reducing the reliability of their OOS rates. To refine the analysis, a secondary average was calculated, excluding these four carriers:

Table Two: Adjusted Average Out-of-Service Data (Excluding Carriers 10-13)

Discussion

This small-sample field study reveals notable safety compliance concerns among carriers operating near high-volume e-commerce hubs. The adjusted average vehicle OOS rate of 34% significantly exceeds national norms and warrants further examination.

The consistent absence of U.S.-origin names across observed carriers may suggest broader demographic and ownership trends in contract freight. However, this observation alone cannot draw definitive conclusions and should be investigated further through formal audits or structured interviews.

Conclusion 1

While limited in scope, this study raises questions about operational practices and safety performance among carriers servicing Amazon or operating in its vicinity. Future studies could expand the observation period, incorporate interviews, or leverage FMCSA enforcement data to provide a more comprehensive assessment of carrier legitimacy, safety risk, and potential regulatory avoidance behaviors.

Carrier Background Review

This section summarizes findings from public records to assess each carrier’s registration history, business legitimacy, and potential red flags.

Carrier 1

The listed address matches an inactive USDOT associated with a similarly named company, active from March 6, 2021, to February 22, 2023. A new, active USDOT was registered on May 29, 2023, suggesting a potential re-registration.

Additionally, two other inactive USDOTs were registered to separate units within the same apartment complex—possibly indicating the use of a shared residential address for multiple carrier authorities. This clustering may suggest using identity resets or shell registrations, often called ‘chameleon carriers’ or ‘ghost carriers.’

Carrier 3

A current or former address associated with Carrier 3 is linked to 30 other USDOT numbers. This concentration strongly suggests using a virtual office or registration service, a practice sometimes associated with carriers attempting to obscure operational continuity or regulatory history. Ownership and control of these entities could not be determined without further investigation.

Carrier 10

Carrier 10’s current address matches one inactive USDOT number. Though no direct link between the entities was confirmed, public records suggest the USDOT may have been transferred or purchased in March 2025. Such transfers, while legal, can sometimes mask prior safety issues or ownership changes.

Additionally, when photographing Carrier 10’s truck, the experimenter noted that the company name on the cab appeared deliberately distorted, making it difficult to read on camera. This may indicate the use of anti-camera font or styling, a tactic used to evade surveillance or roadside documentation.

Carrier 11

Carrier 11 appears to have operated under a previous USDOT number that is now inactive. That registration was active from June 7, 2017, to October 1, 2018, and was marked Out of Service – New Entrant Revoked for Failure of Safety Audit. This indicates the carrier did not pass the required safety audit during the probationary period, resulting in the revocation of their authority.

A new USDOT number was established on October 25, 2022, suggesting a restart of operations under fresh authority. This re-registration, especially following a failed safety audit, could indicate an attempt to reset compliance history and resume operations without addressing prior deficiencies.

Conclusion 2

This is a snapshot from one roadside, one Amazon warehouse, one 37-minute window.

And it still revealed layered patterns of compliance concerns, identity resets, and operational obscurity.

The takeaway?

Safety enforcement is reactive, not proactive.

Carrier identity resets, DOT shopping, and virtual office use are often hidden in plain sight–until a crash.

If you’re in freight, logistics, or policy, this is worth looking at more closely.

As a shipper or broker, you may be onboarding carriers with histories you’ll never see in plain daylight.